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Representations of Oil in Chad:
A Blessing or a Curse? 
Seign-goura Yorbana
Abstract: This article presents representations of oil in Chad which have 
been drawn from ethnographic interviews with a variety of actors, most 
notably with local oil workers and inhabitants from the oil-producing 
areas of the country. It reveals that a decade of oil exploitation in Chad 
was sufficient enough time for a collective imaginary to emerge regarding 
the implicit and explicit effects of oil. Expectations about the impact of 
the extractive industry on local development have not been met, which 
has led communities to develop sometimes paradoxical feelings towards, 
beliefs about, and representations of oil. What began as a belief that oil is 
a gift from god to help to alleviate poverty has given way to a disap-
pointed sense that oil is in fact a curse. This has seen people use meta-
phors involving fire, the devil, disease, animals, and cursed money to 
express the harsh realities of Chad’s mining industries. These myths, rep-
resentations, and discussions about oil embody and explicate the resource 
curse theory. 
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For over a decade, the heart of Chad’s economy has beat to the rhythm 
of oil-price fluctuations. It was in 2003 that Chad opened the sluice gates 
to the first oil well in southern Doba. Crude oil is exported by an oil 
consortium via the Kribi facility in Cameroon through a pipeline that is 
over a thousand kilometres long. The Chad–Cameroon oil pipeline pro-
ject, also known as the Chad Development Project, is supported by the 
World Bank. The scheme stirred up hopes that it would help the country 
to develop and to alleviate poverty. “The overall objective of the project 
was to ensure that oil revenues will be used to fight against poverty and 
the expenditure will be made under the Act” (Hicks 2015: 48).1 Since the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, multinational companies have 
continued to trample through Chad in order to prospect for or exploit 
the country’s oil – sometimes doing both. 
Esso Chad (a consortium composed of US and Malaysian com-
panies), the China National Petroleum Corporation, Caracal Energy 
(Canadian), and Glencore (Anglo-Swiss) are amongst the oil giants that 
control the economic chessboard and shape the lives of oil workers in a 
dozen companies in the extractive industry in Chad. Oil revenue ac-
counts for 73 per cent of revenue and 90 per cent of exports, totalling 
USD 12 billion since 2003 (La Lettre du Continent 2015). Oil production 
has economic, political, and social consequences. Access to oil revenues, 
or a lack thereof, affects people’s circumstances. Through their practices, 
multinational oil companies leave footprints on natural and human re-
sources, which prompts communities to develop social constructs, espe-
cially myths and representations.2 Jodelet (1989: 53) defines “representa-
tions” as “une forme de connaissance, socialement élaborée et partagée, ayant une 
1  As a requirement of the World Bank’s loan agreement with Chad, a law entitled 
Law No. 001 was passed in 1999 and revised in 2006. It dictates that oil reven-
ues should be distributed across what they consider to be priority sectors: edu-
cation, health, water, and security. In short, it is designated for poverty allevia-
tion. This law was inspired by a Norwegian legal model for oil revenue distri-
bution, which has been a success in terms of driving local sustainable develop-
ment and retaining transparency. 
2  In this article I define a “social myth” as “une représentation collective hybride, bénéfique 
ou nuisible, baignant dans le sacré, commandée par l’émotion plus que par la raison, et porteuse 
de sens, de valeurs et d’idéaux façonnés dans un environnement social et historique donné ” (“a 
hybrid collective representation, beneficial or harmful, bathing in the sacred, 
controlled more by emotion than by reason, and carrying meanings, values and 
ideals fashioned in a particular social and historical environment”) (Bouchard 
2013: 68). 
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visée pratique et concourant à la construction d’une réalité commune à un ensemble.”3 
Thus, we must ask ourselves, what representations of oil exploitation do 
local populations and oilfield workers in Chad produce? 
Social constructs and representations regarding oil are the subjective 
expression of the positive and negative realities of oil exploitation in 
Chad. They reflect the expectations, satisfactions, and disappointments 
experienced by local people and workers. In this article I present the 
social myths and mystical-/magical-religious representations that I un-
covered during my investigation in the oil-producing areas of Doba and 
Koudalwa. By using interviews and observation analysis I aimed to 
(i) reveal the ways in which members of the Chadian community and oil 
workers appropriate oil exploitation and (ii) interpret these represen-
tations in the context of the institutional models and legal innovations 
designed to ensure that oil projects bring about development and allevi-
ate poverty in oil-producing areas. Of relevance here are travelling and 
local appropriation models, which – according to Behrends and Hoin-
athy (2014) – explain how the translation of and meanings within theor-
etical models vary depending on the various actors’ perspectives and 
contexts. For the group of actors I studied, the meaning attached to oil 
production is revealed by comparing the positive or negative oil exploi-
tation myths with the expectations for local development that were at-
tached to oil production.  
This analysis is based on observations and interviews I carried out 
while working on the Doba and Bongor oilfields between 2002 and 2008 
and while working as a researcher in the same areas between 2009 and 
2014.4 The interviews I conducted as an oil worker were informal and 
unstructured and covered oil-related themes with people whom I met 
whilst visiting or working on the oilfields in Doba, Bebedja, and Satan 
Village and spending time in the towns and cities in the oil production 
areas. Some of these people were oilfield employees and some were not. 
For this article, I reconstructed some of the interviews based on what I 
could remember. These workers considered me to be one of them, so they 
did not hesitate to answer my questions. If they had known about my 
position on the company’s management team, they would have distrusted 
me and likely suspected me of wanting to betray them to their bosses.  
3  “A form of knowledge, socially developed and shared, with a practical aim and 
contributing to the building of a common reality.” 
4  I held the following posts in the oilfield with a number of different companies: 
administrative assistant, travel coordinator, administrator, and logistician. My 
work as a researcher took place while I was a student at the University of Gen-
eva, Switzerland, and later at the University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland. 
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To address these issues, I carried out direct in situ observations and 
semi-direct interviews with members of civil society organisations – such 
as the Group for Alternative Research and Monitoring of the Chad-
Cameroon Petroleum Project (GRAMPTC), the Oil Permanent Local 
Committee, and the Commission Permanente Pétrole de N’djaména 
(CPPN) – oil workers, local authorities, people on the ground, the oil 
company’s management team and subcontracting companies, local resi-
dents, and anybody else who could provide relevant information. The 
open questioning used in these semi-direct interviews allowed respond-
ents to give their opinions on oil exploitation in Chad, the use of oil 
revenues, multinational policies, and the advantages and disadvantages of 
extractive activities in oil production areas (specifically, the Chad Devel-
opment Project in Doba and the Rônier Project in the Bongor region). 
I compiled a database composed of more than 30 interviews on the 
issue of oil in Chad. For this article, I used 10 that I considered to be 
most relevant. Some respondents feared reprisals due to the nature of 
the information they provided and the sensitivity of the question of oil in 
Chad; therefore, they were identified anonymously as “Respondent” and 
allocated a number (see list of interviews, page 83). Whether interviews 
were recorded depended on each respondent’s preference. I employ 
qualitative research and a discourse analysis, drawing on interviews and 
field observations.5 In many host communities in oil-rich countries, in-
habitants still believe that subsurface resources come from an invisible 
world beyond their control. This explains why they associate under-
ground and subsurface resources with the world of ancestors, devils, 
darkness, taboos, or God. As Gordon (2012) states, spirits still matter in 
postcolonial Africa, which continues to be influenced by the rituals and 
beliefs of the precolonial period. Some Africans see their realities as 
being controlled by invisible agents or spirits which take on different 
forms, manifesting themselves as gods, animals, diseases, or simply as 
evil. Despite the prevalent point of view in local communities that oil is 
something that is extracted from an invisible world (i.e. a mythic re-
source), policymakers ignore this. Sometimes, this creates frustration and 
leads to confrontation amongst people in the local communities. Below, 
I discuss the manifestations of those contradictions.6  
5  This study is therefore not based on a representative sample but on conversa-
tions held with some of my interlocutors and on informal conversations carried 
out on oilfields in Chad. 
6  I would like to thank my colleagues from the Summer School in Lasdel, Niger, 
class of 2014, to whom the first version of this article was presented, and who 
went to great lengths to provide useful criticism and commentary. I am also 
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Representations of Oil as Heaven-Sent Manna 
Since Chad gained independence, oil exploration activities carried out by 
foreign companies have uncovered oil reserves in the basins of Lake Chad, 
Erdis, Doba, Bongor, and Doseo in the south. The exploitation of these 
reserves began in 2000 in the Doba basin by a consortium consisting of 
ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, and Petronas. In 2006 the China National 
Petroleum Corporation started extracting in the Bongor Basin, and in 
2011 the Caracal Energy Consortium (acquired by Glencore in 2014) 
began work in the Dosea basin. As is the case with all mining and oil 
extraction activities, this required significant mobilisation of financial, 
human, and material resources, including cutting-edge technology. The 
extraction work had economic, social, and environmental impacts on the 
areas where the sites were located and for the local populations. While I 
was working there, I saw how the natural vegetation of this region gave 
way to the landscape of the extractive industry in one year. Strewn with 
cars, cranes, rigs, derricks, and containers, it became an “oil city” in a 
rural setting. It is worth adding that this was the first time that an extrac-
tion project in Chad had mobilised such a significant amount of human 
and material resources. 
For my interviewees in the oil-producing area of Doba, oil was seen 
as manna sent from heaven. One respondent, a peasant whom I met in the 
Kome oil region, declared that “God sent us oil” (Respondent 2, 2002). 
Another, from the Koudalwa area, said that  
it is a blessing to have oil under your land. Why else would we have 
found oil only in Doba and Koudalwa, and not elsewhere in Chad? 
(Respondent 14)  
The above statements reveal a belief amongst these people that because 
they have been chosen by God to receive the gift of oil, it is therefore 
their right to enjoy all the benefits that ensue from oil development in 
their area. This idea of a divine promise of wealth can also be found 
amongst the people of the oil-producing Niger Delta in Nigeria. Ac-
cording to Adunbi (2015: 4), they too claim ownership over the natural 
resources in the region and the right to benefit from them. According to 
widespread mythology in both Chad and Nigeria, oil is a legacy of wealth 
that is passed on from ancestors to their descendants. 
Although the interviewees lack a clear understanding of the oil ex-
ploitation process and of how oil is sold, their responses make it clear 
                                                                                                    
grateful to the anonymous reviewers at the Africa Spectrum whose insightful criti-
cism helped me to improve this article. 
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that they know that, either directly or indirectly, the oil production chain 
leads to money. As one peasant explained,  
this is our oil, oil from our land. We are not begging. We just want 
our money after the oil has been sold; it belongs to us. (Respond-
ent 20) 
The Entente des Populations de la Zone Pétrolière (EPOZOP) is an 
unofficial advocacy network that was set up to represent the interests of 
inhabitants in the oil-producing area (Petry and Bambé 2005: 167). Dur-
ing my conversations with Respondents 12, 14, and 20, I learned that oil 
exploitation offered several benefits, such as revenue from selling land to 
multinationals, regular income from working in the oilfield, and mone-
tary handouts from multinationals. Some interlocutors (Respondents 2 
and 8) rejected the idea of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
granting credit to local people. According to them, everything should be 
given freely because the oil that funds all these benefits comes “from 
their land, the land of their ancestors” (Respondents 2 and 8). In his 
study on the oil-producing area of Logone Oriental, Moutédé-Madji 
(2012: 5) finds that the credit-granting project in the Doba oil-producing 
area flopped because the repayment rate was under 40 per cent. We can 
also question whether it was this same concept of oil as “manna from 
heaven, given to the producing region” which is the basis of the Norwe-
gian oil revenue management system – currently considered to be the 
best model for oil revenue management in the world. Indeed, the Nor-
wegian model distributes oil revenues in a way that values local human 
resources and development without compromising future generations. A 
fund has also been established for future generations. It is this philoso-
phy that the Chadian government has adopted to secure the support of 
both the international community and a section of the national commu-
nity in their quest to exploit Chad’s oil. In fact, the Norwegian model’s 
influence on Chad’s oil revenue management policy was formalised in 
Law No. 001, which states that 5 per cent of oil revenues should be used 
to develop the oil-producing region. Other countries similarly distribute 
a percentage of oil revenues to oil-producing areas: Bolivia, 13 per cent; 
Brazil, 17 per cent; Nigeria, 13 per cent; Indonesia, 6 per cent; and 
Ghana, 2 per cent (Arellano-Yanguas and Mejía-Acosta 2014: 4).  
The texts used here present the reality of oil production in Chad – 
which has witnessed ten years of oil exploitation and the establishment 
of institutions that govern oil revenues – and its impact on local people. 
In Doba, despite the completion of various infrastructural projects (a 
stadium, schools, the electrification of the city, paved roads) financed by 
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oil revenues, it seems that oil wealth has not been a blessing. Local 
people have not seen the development that they were promised or even 
experienced an improvement in their living conditions (Mabali and 
Mantobaye 2015). In fact, the level of monetary poverty has been ex-
acerbated due to the inflation that has inevitably accompanied oil ex-
ploitation. In 2011 a group of civil society organisations filed a complaint 
with the World Bank on behalf of local farmers and other community 
members affected by the Chad–Cameroon Petroleum Development and 
Pipeline Project.7 The complaint, which was judged to be admissible, 
outlined some of the negative impacts of the project: increased poverty 
levels, land grabbing, loss of livelihoods, water and environmental pollu-
tion, inadequate compensation, and a lack of appropriate monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms. This paper sheds light on why characterisations 
depicting the project as a curse abound in the oil-producing area. 
Sin Cities: Representation of Satan Village
and Moudadoigne as Revivals of Sodom
and Gomorrah 
In the oil producing area around the Doba oilfields, spontaneous settle-
ments emerged. Comprised of houses built from makeshift materials 
gleaned from the oilfields and seccos (grasses used to construct fences and 
roofs) (see Hoinathy 2013: 164), these settlements are inhabited by both 
local residents and those oilfield workers who are not permitted to sleep 
in the camps built by the oil companies.8 Due to their appearance, the 
fact they are guarded, and the rules in place there, Chadian oil workers 
have compared the camps to Guantánamo (Coll 2012: 350 cited by 
Hicks 2015: 52). 
The Satan Village settlement is located next to Kome Base, which is 
home to most of the oil companies and acts as the hub of Doba’s crude 
oil exploitation. Respondents 2, 6, and 12 explained that the village began 
to develop in 2000, following the start of the Doba Oil Project. The first 
people who came in search of employment built makeshift houses in 
front of the oil camp and slept there in the hope of finding work. Those 
who managed to secure employment, mostly labourers, continued to live 
7  The World Bank has set up a stakeholder mediation mechanism for projects 
financed by itself or by its partners. For more details, see <www.cao-ombuds 
man.org/about/whoweare/index.html>. 
8  The camps built by oil companies are intended for expatriates and Chadian 
workers recruited from outside the oil-producing region. 
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in the settlement despite having jobs on site. Gradually, the settlement 
grew as workers brought their families, and as others arrived to take ad-
vantage of the opportunities there. This led to drinking establishments 
and restaurants being set up and the emergence of prostitution in the 
area. Satan Village provided oil company employees, both locals and 
expatriates, with access to various activities and services. Initially, Western 
expatriate workers were free to leave the camp and visit Satan Village. 
Over time, however, they faced increasing restrictions until leaving the 
camp was eventually strictly forbidden, allegedly for security reasons. 
Moudadoigne, another settlement, overlooks Kome 5 and is about ten 
kilometres from Kome Base. Literally translated, the local-dialect term 
“moudadoigne” means “the vagina will bite you,” which is a reference to the 
extensive prostitution in the village (Hoinathy 2013: 164). 
Because the materials used to construct the dwellings in the settle-
ments are highly flammable, there have been a number of fires. During my 
time as an oilfield employee, I saw Satan Village go up in flames three 
times between 2002 and 2006. However, the settlements are typically re-
built within a week because they are vital to the working population. Re-
spondents 2, 6, and 15 speak about the settlements and the fires that hap-
pen there in a way that challenges the concept of oil as a blessing and puts 
forward the concept of oil as a curse. They do not consider life in the 
encampments, which is rife with alcoholism and prostitution, to be a good 
life, and they blame oil exploitation in the area for this. Some respondents 
(6, 12, and 20) went so far as to compare Satan Village and Moudadoigne 
to the biblical cities of Sodom and Gomorrah.9 Respondent 6 (2005), a 
resident of Satan Village, said that “the recurring fires in the village are 
simply a reflection and translation of this divine punishment.”  
Today, more than a decade after the start of oil exploitation in 
Doba, the statements made by those I interviewed, and the views held by 
Chadians in general, are clear: “Le pétrole ne nous a rien apporté de positif sinon 
des problems”10 (Le Temps 2014; Hicks 2015). These declarations of failure 
create fertile ground for myths about oil exploitation. It is thus unsur-
prising that the content of my discussions with respondents on the in-
vestment of oil revenues in priority sectors such as security, education, 
and health contrasts with that issued by the authorities. For instance, 
while oil workers and Chadians talk about biblical punishment, the vice 
president of Doba’s 5 per cent Committee argues that they have 
9  Sodom and Gomorrah are two cities in the Old Testament where the unethical 
or blasphemous behaviours of the inhabitants attracted the anger of God, who 
inflicted a fatal punishment on them: fire. 
10  “Oil has not brought us anything positive, it has only brought problems.” 
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done a lot of agricultural development, improving access to drinking 
water, reclaiming farms and helping to improve animal husbandry. 
Those things really make a difference. (Hicks 2015: 53) 
The Elephant with Black-Gold Tusks:
Wounded in Chad but Died Elsewhere 
In some of the interviews (10 and 15), it was clear that the exploitation of 
oil certainly brings advantages, but they are considered to be insufficient 
when compared to the profits made by foreign partners. According to a 
report by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), extract-
ive companies paid the government of Chad over an estimated USD 2 
billion in 2012 (EITI 2014). Experts roughly calculate that the amount of 
profit being made by extractive companies is even larger than that made by 
the government; however, this is only an estimate as the concession 
agreement that governs the project has not been made public. In his book 
examining ExxonMobil, Steve Coll (2012: 369) provides us with an insight 
into where these revenues go, explaining that the oil project enabled  
ExxonMobil and its partners to generate several billion dollars of 
topline revenue, to forge a path to profitability just as world oil 
prices spiked, and to embed themselves with Déby’s regime, posi-
tion the corporation for additional oil deals beyond those covered 
by the original bargain. 
Critics have pointed out that oil exploitation has a detrimental effect on 
the local community, highlighting a whole litany of disadvantages: envir-
onmental degradation, growing inequality, criminality, and prostitution. 
According to Frank and Guesnet (2010: 41) and Hoinathy (2013), the ar-
rival of immigrants and expatriate workers has also driven up the cost of 
living, making life even more difficult for local people. The oil-project 
benefit most widely cited by respondents is employment opportunities 
on the oilfields for Chadians. Nevertheless, despite the Esso Chad con-
sortium employing more than 5,000 Chadians, complaints persist that 
foreign workers are prioritised over locals (Hicks 2015: 71). Respondents 
8, 10, and 20 complained that expats earned much more than them for 
the same role – something various respondents attributed to Chad’s 
inexperience and poor negotiation skills when drawing up the oil trading 
contracts. A former accounting department executive who dealt with the 
salaries of both expats and local employees (Respondent 10, 2011) claims 
that expatriates can earn over USD 15,000 per month more than their 
Chadian counterparts. This executive explains that the astronomical 
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differences between local and expatriate wages is due to the fact that 
expatriates are paid according to the pay scales of their companies in 
their home countries and also receive many bonuses linked to their ex-
patriate status. He also reveals that expatriates are additionally given per 
diems (which are sometimes equal to the full salaries of local employees) 
to cover everyday on-site expenses. The Chadian authorities and multi-
nationals justify this situation of wage inequality by pointing out that 
wages are given according to salary scales and the cost of living in em-
ployees’ own countries. According to Respondents 12, 15, and 20, how-
ever, many oil-producing countries have collective agreements governing 
the oil sector and are therefore not faced with such large wage differ-
ences. Expectedly, they question why Chad cannot do the same. Oil 
workers interpret this situation as an injustice towards them.  
With non-Chadians enjoying more benefits from oil exploitation 
through subcontracting or consultancy work, local respondents men-
tioned feeling like everything was stacked against them. To illustrate this 
injustice, in parts of Chad, particularly in Doba, people use the metaphor 
of the elephant with black-gold tusks that was wounded in Chad but 
went to die in Cameroon – in other words, it is Chad’s neighbours and 
other foreigners who benefit most from Chad’s oil reserves. Respondent 
20 cited this metaphor to describe how experienced and competent 
Cameroonian negotiators involved in the Chad–Cameroon Pipeline 
Project drove up the cost of the right to transport oil on their territory, 
ensuring that their country’s profits were high compared to those made 
by Chad.11  
The contract between Chad and the consortium is based on the 
Convention for Exploration, Exploitation, and Transportation of Hy-
drocarbons and its 1988 amendments. The agreement provides Chad 
with an oil royalty rate of 12.5 per cent, which some observers consider 
to be much lower than the oil royalty rates of many other African oil-
producing countries (Gary and Reisch 2005: 38). The fact that this is a 
concession contract (which offers more benefits to companies than to 
the government) instead of a production-sharing contract (which allows 
the state to be a shareholder in the exploitation of its resource) also per-
petuates the narrative that the Chadian government is poor at negotiating 
contracts. Chad did, however, raise its oil royalty rates to 14.25 per cent 
11  See Mbodiam, Brice R. (2013), Le droit de transit du pétrole tchadien sur le terri-
toire camerounais revalorisé de 195 à 618 FCfa le baril, in: Africatime.com, online: 
<http://fr.africatime.com/tchad/articles/le-droit-de-transit-du-petrole-tchadien-
sur-le-territoire-camerounais-revalorise-de-195-618#sthash.8JczoXcc.JbLLfvDf.d 
puf> (12 December 2015). 
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in 2014. Some of the interviews seem to reveal that some people confuse 
the crude and refined oil used in oil lamps in the poorer neighbour-
hoods. They claim not to have even seen or benefitted from the crude oil 
extracted by US companies.12 
A complex system of oil exploitation set up by multinationals and 
misunderstood by some local interviewees has led to conversations that 
are focused on the unequal distribution of oil – a resource claimed by 
communities who consider it their right to benefit from the sale of oil on 
the world market.  
Ephemeral Wealth: Oil Sector Salaries
Perceived as the Devil’s Money 
Oil workers are amongst the highest paid workers in Chad. According to 
the salary scale of the Chad–Cameroon Constructors Company, a la-
bourer in category 1.1 earned a monthly salary (excluding bonuses) of 
XAF 59,995 in 2003 – twice Chad’s guaranteed minimum wage (salaire 
minimum interprofessionnel garanti, SMIG) of XAF 30,000.13 According to 
Moutédé-Madji (2004), in 2003 semi-skilled and skilled oilfield workers 
earned at least XAF 120,000 per month, which excluded the various 
bonuses that could double or even quadruple their basic salaries.14 The 
attractiveness of oilfield wages has caused departures of employees from 
non-oil sectors. For instance, a large number of teachers in the Doba and 
Bebidja regions, particularly English teachers, have abandoned their 
public-sector positions to find jobs on the oilfields as translators or as 
skilled employees. Moutédé-Madji (2004: 16) explains the repercussions 
of this trend,  
par ailleurs, les travaux sur le chantier trouble quotidiennement le monde paysan 
aussi. A la fin des travaux de construction en 2003, on a évalué le nombre de 
Tchadiens employés à 7000 personnes pour une masse salariale totale de 23 
milliards de francs CFA. Il faut noter que plus de 50% de ces emplois sont 
temporaires. Il s’agit des paysans recrutés dans la zone du projet pour les tra-
vaux manuels, ce qui pousse beaucoup de paysans à abandonner leurs champs 
12  The oil from the rônier fields in Chad – operated by the Chinese company China 
National Petroleum Corporation – is refined in Djermaya, Chad, and marketed in 
Chad, whereas the oil from the Doba Project is exported as crude oil. 
13  The SMIG in Chad was raised to XAF 60,000 in 2011. 
14  Unskilled workers were paid about XAF 2,000 per day. 
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au profit des travaux mieux rémunérés. Il en est de même pour les maîtres com-
munautaires qui ont abandonné les écoles, entraînant leur fermeture.15 
Oilfield workers, known locally as “oilmen” (which in Chad’s poorer 
neighbourhoods refers to anyone employed by a multinational directly or 
by a subcontractor), directly benefit from oil exploitation. Although their 
salaries only represent a small proportion of oil revenues, oilfield workers 
earn significantly higher wages than do their peers in the public sector. 
For instance, a graduate working in the Ministry of Education earned 
about XAF 250,000 in 2000, whereas an executive with the same degree 
could earn more than XAF 500,000 in the oil sector. It should be noted, 
however, that Chinese oil companies are not considered to treat their 
employees as well as other subcontractors do in Chad (Yorbana 2014: 
122). Nevertheless, oilmen in Chad enjoy a high standard of living, and 
their material wealth enables them to purchase real estate, means of 
transportation, or anything that might be perceived as a status symbol. In 
fact, some lead rather ostentatious, debauched lives. Their financial power 
and status can even extend to their spouses. According to one respond-
ent, oilmen “run after the most beautiful women, and the women wear 
jewellery made out of gold or other expensive materials as an external 
indication of their wealth” (Respondent 7, 2008). During my fieldwork in 
Doba, I myself observed that the spouses of oilmen wear better quality 
and more expensive clothing as well as jewellery whether at the market, 
out socially, or for more formal occasions. Furthermore, unlike the wives 
of peasants and public servants, the spouses of oilmen do not haggle at 
the market when it comes to purchasing staple products like fish or 
chicken; this reflects their high social standing and, more specifically, the 
fact that they have enough money to buy anything they like. 
Some of the oilmen that I interviewed were aware of the nature of 
their lifestyles. One explained to me that  
oil is ephemeral wealth that goes hand in hand with the devil. Oil 
money does not last; it is cursed money. The devil is in charge 
when you spend it. (Respondent 25)  
15  “Moreover, work on the construction site also disrupts peasant life. When con-
struction was completed in 2003, it was estimated that the number of Chadians 
employed was 7,000 for a total payroll of XAF 23 billion. It should be noted that 
over 50 per cent of these jobs are temporary. Most are peasants recruited in the 
local area to do manual labour, prompting many farmers to abandon their fields 
in favour of these better-paid jobs. The same happened with community teachers 
who left their schools, bringing about the closure of these schools.” 
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Another said, “sometimes we spend foolishly, buying expensive clothes or 
cars just so that we can be seen in them,” before adding that “only the 
devil would allow this to happen” (Respondent 12). Some oilmen consider 
oil to bring about easy money and consumer goods, with the devil acting 
as a guiding force. So if you buy a piece of paradise with oil money, you 
will discover that it is just a mirage. According to Miankéol (2010), com-
munity members in the villages of Maikeri and Poutouguem made the 
same observation: oil is easy money and, therefore, problematic. This 
association between easy money (oil money) and the devil can also be 
found in Colombia (sugar cane plantations) and in India (mines) (Taussig 
2010). According to Taussig, workers in these sectors speak of making a 
pact with the devil when they start working on the plantations or in the 
mines but not when they are working their own land. Taussig (2010: 13) 
contends that  
as peasant cultivators became landless wage labourers, they in-
voked the devil as part of the process of maintaining or increasing 
production. However, as peasants working their own land ac-
cording to their own customs they do not do this. 
In the case of Colombia, Taussig interprets this phenomenon as a result 
of the capitalist conquest in South America, which led to proletarisation 
and speculation. The capitalist system brought about alienation and, 
therefore, deprivation and thus created relations of production which did 
not previously exist in Colombian culture. 
Before the exploitation of oil in Chad, there were rich farmers, in 
particular cotton farmers. They certainly did not associate their wealth with 
the devil, because they produced and also sold their own products – a 
point that reinforces Taussig’s (2010) argument. But oil development led 
to the establishment of a capitalist mode of production which resulted in 
farmers being dispossessed of their land and becoming workers within the 
new relations of production. In these capitalist relations easy money and 
the devil intervened. The notion that oil revenue is easy money may stem 
from the fact that speculation in natural resources generates a lot of 
money, making it seem that money can be acquired effortlessly, whereas 
before the oil era, respondents were accustomed to working the land to 
make money, and money only came about through hard work.  
My interviews reveal that people both living near the oil exploration 
sites and throughout Chad had high expectations at the beginning of the 
oil exploitation project. They had been promised by the highest govern-
ment authorities that the project would benefit the whole nation and 
would be implemented through local or regional development plans 
(Gary and Reisch 2005: 76). But today, a decade after the first barrel of 
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oil was extracted in Chad, opinions are not so positive. Respondent 13 
(2012), a peasant from the village of Koudalwa, told me that “oil is a 
cursed resource”, referring to the environmental damage and social 
problems caused by oil exploitation in the area. The negative social and 
environmental impacts of the Doba Oil Project are striking. As Gary and 
Reisch point out (2005: 32–33), poor waste management, land grabbing 
by multinational companies, inadequate compensation policies, pollution, 
and limits to freedom of movement all affect the local population in the 
oil areas. The expectations and disappointments of Chadians are so well 
expressed by Frank and Guesnet (2010) in the title of their report, We 
were promised development but all we got is misery. 
Referring to this sense of disappointment, one respondent (12) told 
me that oil money is cursed and is therefore squandered quickly. He did 
not understand why he was squandering his salary and why he could not 
make good investments, so he went to consult a witch doctor. From the 
oracles he was given, he said he saw his money in the hands of the devil 
and understood that the devil is a bad advisor. In short, for my respond-
ents, oil is a cursed resource, and the money that ensues from it cannot 
have lasting beneficial effects. As one oilman put it, “everything is 
ephemeral and in vain” (Respondent 8, 2009). Similarly, Behrends (2011: 
81) speaks of the harmful consequences of oil, showing the harsh work-
ing conditions of the guards who take care of the oil installations day and 
night in the bush. One security guard based in Doba said, “oil is shit”, 
pointing out that oil money is being used to finance the war in eastern 
Chad instead of funding development. 
Those surveyed consider the negative effects associated with the use 
of oil revenue to exceed the benefits. It is this that fuels the narrative of 
the oil curse, which is symbolised by images of the devil and dirty money.  
Long-Term Effects: Oil Characterised as 
Ringworm or Indelible Ink 
Some respondents (8, 12, and 15) believe that the exploitation of oil in 
their regions has had marked, perhaps even ineradicable, consequences. 
The harmful effects of oil production are etched in the memory of the 
inhabitants in those regions as though written in indelible ink. They told 
me that during the oil era, they “have seen all the colours” – which is an 
expression that means they have faced many challenges. According to 
them, the sizes of their fields have been reduced, their cultural sites have 
been destroyed, and the cost of living has increased. Their statements 
point to the work of Hoinathy (2013), a Chadian social anthropologist 
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who compared oil exploitation to ringworm, a fungus that can leave a 
scar even after being treated.16 Reyna (2011) – who interviewed locals in 
the Doba region in 2002, 2003, and 2007 – also claims that his respond-
ents unanimously declared that the exploitation of oil had caused them 
severe suffering. According to Reyna (2011: 153), generally speaking, 
only senior state officials in the region qualify oil extraction in Doba as a 
success; for the majority, oil exploitation has had an indelible effect on 
local communities and their traditional ways of life. According to my 
respondents, the lack of concrete positive outcomes resulting from oil 
revenue led the Mongo people in the Doba region to organise a forum in 
April 2015 in which they called for money generated by oil extraction to 
be invested in the region and for local people to be involved in the ad-
ministration of the region and, in particular, oil revenue management.  
Conclusion 
A decade of oil exploitation, initially presented as a way out of poverty, 
has had rather mixed effects in Chad. Despite early optimism, the inter-
views show that poverty levels actually increased amongst large parts of 
the populations in the oil-producing areas and that oil production only 
benefitted a minority: the financial elite and the oilmen. Eventually, dis-
illusionment set in.  
Mythology and metaphors involving the devil, elephants, Sodom 
and Gomorrah, and disease featured in the statements of interviewees. 
The religious imagination of the local population in Chad successfully 
portrays the paradoxes of oil exploitation and, indeed, the resource 
curse. It confirms the spiritualism surrounding oil extraction and the 
effects of oil as a subsurface resource. The institutions that were sup-
posed to ward off the resource curse seem to be ineffectual, and this 
puts into question the efficacy of the ready-made solutions proposed to 
developing countries by major international powers or institutions. Such 
capitalist-based solutions have shaken the lifestyles and beliefs of work-
ers and local residents in the mining areas in southern Chad. It is timely 
that Behrends and Hoinathy (2014: 78–79) state that the World Bank’s 
oil management model has not found fertile ground amongst the popu-
lation of the oil-producing areas in Chad; these people have a different 
understanding and interpretation of the institutional model of Chadian 
16 See rfi AFRIQUE, Remadji Hoinathy sur RFI: Pour les Tchadiens de Béro, le 
pétrole est “une teigne,” 17 November 2013, online: <www.rfi.fr/afrique/2013 
1117-remadji-hoinathy-rfi-tchad-bero-petrole-teigne-esso> (13 December 2015). 
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oil. The myths mentioned above clearly reflect not only the anxieties, 
sensibilities, and beliefs of local residents and Chadians with respect to 
oil exploitation (a booming activity which Chadians must continue to 
deal with) but also their hopes and ideals. In this context one should 
mention Watts (2001), who – when studying the communities of the oil-
producing regions in the Niger Delta and in Ecuador – discovered not 
only that oil exploitation transformed the lives of those communities but 
also that those communities too experienced oil revenues as easy money, 
as something mystical and ephemeral. These representations of oil also 
come to the fore in the beliefs expressed in the interviews I conducted 
with the local community members and oil workers in Chad. 
Oil determines the strengths and weaknesses of our contemporary 
techno-industrial society. Looking beyond its practical uses, can we con-
sider oil to be a mysterious resource? The mystical-/magical-religious 
representations of oil expressed by the local populations and oil workers 
in Chad, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Venezuela seem to stand the test of time 
and persist. Might we say that these representations are a form of protest 
and resistance against the capitalist process of alienation, which is em-
bodied in the extractive industry and in the international institutions that 
extract the local resources of communities that are still considered to be 
in need of being “developed”? Is it not yet time to think about how to 
address those social imaginaries and representations which swing oil 
between extractivism and spiritualism or between blessing and curse in 
order to reverse the resource curse theory which has persisted over time? 
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List of the Author’s Interviews in Chad, 2002–2014 
Respondent- 
number 
Status, year Location 
Respondent 2 Kome Village peasant, 2002 Logone Oriental (Doba) 
Respondent 6 Satan Village labourer, 2005 Logone Oriental (Doba) 
Respondent 7 Doba oilman, 2008 Doba 
Respondent 8 Koudalwa labourer, 2009 Koudalwa 
Respondent 10 Kome employee, 2011 Doba 
Respondent 12 Doba oilman, 2011 Doba 
Respondent 13 Koudalwa peasant, 2012 Koudalwa 
Respondent 14 Koudalwa inhabitant, 2012 Koudalwa  
Respondent 15 Doba oilman, 2012 Doba 
Respondent 20 Doba inhabitant, 2014 Doba 
Respondent 25 Kome Base oilman, 2014 Doba  
 
 
Kollektive Vorstellungen zum Erdöl im Tschad:  
Segen oder Fluch? 
Zusammenfassung: Der Autor präsentiert Umschreibungen für Erdöl 
im Tschad, die er bei ethnographischen Interviews von unterschiedlichen 
Akteuren gehört hat, insbesondere von Arbeitern im Erdölsektor und von 
Menschen, die in der Umgebung von Förderanlagen leben. Deutlich wird, 
dass sich nach einem Jahrzehnt der Erdölförderung im Tschad ein System 
kollektiver Vorstellungen zum Erdöl und seinen ideellen und materiellen 
Implikationen gebildet hat. Nachdem alle Hoffnungen auf eine Entfaltung 
lokaler Entwicklungspotenziale unerfüllt blieben, entwickelten sich in der 
Bevölkerung teilweise paradoxe Vorstellungen, Interpretationen und Bil-
der. Der zunächst vorherrschende Glaube, die Entdeckung von Erdöl in 
ihrer Umgebung sei eine göttliche Gabe zur Linderung der Armut, schlug 
um in Enttäuschung und in die Vorstellung, das Erdöl sei in Wahrheit ein 
Fluch. Entsprechend stehen jetzt Vorstellungen und Bilder für das Erdöl, 
in denen Feuer, der Teufel, Krankheiten, Tiere und fluchbeladenes Geld 
eine Rolle spielen, um die brutale Realität der Erdölgewinnung im Tschad 
auszudrücken. Die Entstehung dieser Mythen, Interpretationen und Vor-
stellungen über das Erdöl ist eine Illustration und ein Beleg für die Theorie 
vom Ressourcenfluch. 
Schlagwörter: Tschad, Erdöl, Sozialer Wandel, Soziokultureller Wandel, 
Ressourcenfluch 
